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The percentage statement has nothing to do with the rest of the statements, but clearly they are 
on his mind. 
"Mark has defended against this same argument already before the district court, and it is 
frivolous for Stacy to continue to reiterate the same arguments before this Court." 
(Respondent's briefp. 39) Neither the magistrate nor district courts ruled Stacy was frivolous. 
The children have the right to appropriate child support. The true issue at hand is that Mark 
does not believe that they do, and Mark's Answer to Petition (R., p. 72-74) perfectly backs up 
this statement. In the Answer Mark admits that he and Stacy agreed to recalculate child support. 
Then he denies Stacy's proposed $2,537 per month child support and the pro-rata percentage of 
extra-curricular activity and health expenses, yet he fails to state a recalculated child support that 
he deems appropriate and makes no statement of how he wishes to address extra-curricular 
activity and health expenses. Finally he prays that the petition be dismissed. Apparently, $385 
a month child support and Stacy paying 50% of extra-curricular activity and health expenses is 
appropriate in his mind. Mark's income at time of divorce was at $300,000. (R., p. 27) At the 
time of his Answer to Petition, September 2013 his income was $440,000, (R. p. 63) nearly a 
50% increase. At time of trial Mark's income for 2013 was $550,000. (Tr. p. 23, L.15) 
Brief Statement of Facts 
Mark has an interesting way of coming up with some of his facts and omits facts that 
don't serve him. "The average income earned between 200 I and 2009 was $126,518.67 and 
does not establish a high standard ofliving during the marriage." (Respondent's Brief, p. 5). 
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Pointed out by Stacy at the district court appeal the $126,518.67 is an incorrect figure, he used 
the wrong income in several instances, he decided the $600,000 income in 2000 should not be 
included in the average income figure. (R. pgs.278, 326-327). Furthermore, Mark fails to take 
into account the net proceeds from the sale of the California home in 2003 of$631,589. (Exhibit 
12.) 
His next fact is that Stacy created Exhibit 35 to show the allegedly high standard of living 
during the marriage. (Respondent's Brief, p. 6) At trial, Mark never made one objection to the 
figures on Exhibit 35. Exhibits 11 and l lA were produced for discovery back in the Fall of 
2013, and those exhibits are the same data as Exhibit 35, spending from 2006 through 2009 out 
of Quicken. (Tr. p. 64., L.2-8, p. 83, L. 3-16.) He had ample time look at the figures to discern 
if they looked reliable. He was to request the data contained in the Quicken database under 
I.R.C.P. 34(b) ifhe wished to authentic Quicken. It was not Stacy's burden to provide that for 
him. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 34(b ). Procedure. 
(1) The request may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff 
after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the 
summons and complaint upon that party. The request shall set forth the items to be 
inspected either by individual item or by category, and describe each item and category 
with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and 
manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts. To obtain discovery of 
data or information that exists in electronic or data storage devices in any medium, the 
requesting party must specifically request production of such data and specify the form 
or manner of delivery in which the requesting party wants it produced. (Emphasis added) 
He ignored the proper rules of procedure leaving his objection to trial. "It would seem that trial 
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is the proper time and place for attorney's to make objections to evidence." (Respondent's brief 
p. 7) This is a rather frightening statement. The goal of a child support case should be to 
settle the case as quickly as possible for the sake of the children involved. Mr. Welsh actually 
cancelled the settlement meeting set the week before trial. (Tr. p. 97, L. 1-17) 
The District Court Erred in Affirming: that the Magistrate Did Not Commit Error 
Barring Evidence Per Rule 1006 
Mark quotes a portion of a statement made by Stacy, "[t]he pre-trial conference is the time and 
place for a Judge to ask for exactly what he needs in order to make a fair determination of child 
support ... " and goes on to say that Stacy cites no case, rule or statute. (Respondent's Brief, p. 
10). This is the complete statement: 
"The pre-trial conference is the time and place for a Judge to ask for exactly what he needs 
in order to make a fair determination of child support pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(d), so as to 
prevent undue waste of time at trial and excessive trial expense" (Appellant's Briefp. 13) 
Right after Stacy cites a case, "EDMUNDS v. KRANER•l42 Idaho 867, 877 (Idaho 2006) 
speaks about the importance of the pretrial conferences and also about securing the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding pursuant to I.R.C.P. !(a): 
Our rules of civil procedure and the express purposes behind our discovery rules likewise 
recognize the court's authority to limit the number of expert witnesses. Rule I6(d) (4) 
provides that a court may limit the number of expert witnesses prior to trial. Rule l(a) 
requires that the rules of civil procedure "be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." Our 
discovery rules were designed to prevent surprise at trial, Pearce v. Ollie, 121 
Idaho 539,552,826 l'.2d 888, 901 (1992), and discovery rules regarding expert 
witnesses were designed to promote fairness and candor, see Radmer, PO Idaho at 89. 
813 P.2J at 9011. Effective cross-examination and rebuttal of expert witnesses 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 5 
requires advanced preparation and knowledge of that expert's testimony. Id. Neither 
effective cross-examination nor effective discovery designed to achieve "just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action" can take place when one party is allowed 
to disclose an oppressive number of expert witnesses and the trial court refuses to 
consider limiting expert testimony. St. Alphonsus's statement that they really only 
disclosed three expert witnesses should not have come at the appellate level, but should 
have been dealt with at an early pretrial conference. 
At the very least the trial court should have considered the Edmunds' request to limit the 
number of experts as a discovery issue and examined the purposes behind our discovery 
rules when ruling on the motion. Ideally, the lower court should have held a 
conference pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(d) to discuss limiting the number of experts and 
determine more fully on which issues these experts would be expected to testify in order 
to comport with the purposes behind expert witness discovery and to prevent possible 
discovery abuses. Idaho trial courts are expected to effectively and actively manage 
discovery to achieve the purposes of the discovery rules and to reach a "just, speedy, 
and inexpensive" determination of the issues. Therefore, this Court reverses the district 
court's denial of the Edmunds motion to limit the number of expert witnesses and 
remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. (Bold emphasis added)" 
( Appellants Brief p. 
Stacy's attorney's fees for this case were so high that she could no longer afford to retain Mr. 
Bevis for this appeal, and has been forced to argue this case prose." (Appellant's Briefp. 13, 14) 
"Stacy thinks that the magistrate court should have instructed her as to exactly what 
evidence she was supposed to present at trial in order to sustain her request to be awarded child 
support over and above the Guidelines amount." (Respondent's Briefp. 10). No. Stacy does not 
think that statement nor did she write it. She stated, "The pre-trial conference is the time and 
place for a Judge to ask for exactly what he needs in order to make a fair determination of child 
support pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(d), so as to prevent undue waste of time at trial and excessive 
trial expense" (Appellant's Briefp. 13) 
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule I6(d). Final Pre-Trial Procedure - Formulating 
Issues. 
A pre-trial conference shall be held in any action if requested by any party in writing at 
least 20 days before trial, or if ordered by the court at any time, and the court may direct 
the attorneys for the parties, or any party appearing without an attorney, to submit a 
pre-trial memorandum containing substantially the information enumerated in Rule 16( e) 
and to appear before it for a conference to consider: 
(1) The simplification of the issues; 
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; 
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid 
unnecessary proof; 
( 4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses and the disclosure of the identity of 
persons having knowledge of the relevant facts and who may be called as witnesses; 
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings to be 
used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury; and 
( 6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. 
After the conference, the court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the 
conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the 
parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to 
those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when 
entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to 
prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial 
calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may 
either confine the calendar to jury actions or to nonjury actions or extend it to all 
actions. http:; www.isc.idaho.gov/ircpl 6d 
"Stacy blames the magistrate court for not telling her what to present at trial ... " 
(Respondent's Briefp. 10) Stacy does not blame the magistrate. At pre-trial Stacy's counsel 
stated that there was a budget. He did not explain what kind of budget. The Magistrate 
responded, Well I'm only worried about the budget during the marriage, how much of the child's 
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expenses during the marriage, what they're used to during the marriage. Stacy's attorney stated 
it'saprettyhighstandardofliving. (CORR. Tr.,p.15,L.23-p.16,L.15.) Stacy's counsel 
also stated that the standard ofliving was from $200,000 during the marriage. That's what I 
have in my file. (R., pp.217, 3 51.) Stacy is frustrated by the situation. He stated three times 
that he was only concerned with the budget during the marriage. It seems that there should be 
some accountability on the part of a magistrate. He abused his discretion and the district court 
allowed it. 
"Stacy's argument with regard to Exhibits 11 and l lA is not properly before this Court as 
she did not raise issue with regard to Exhibits 11 and l lA in her appeal before the district court." 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 11) The argument for these Exhibits is exactly the same as for Exhibit 
35. These exhibits were properly preserved for appeal. Exhibit 35 was not. Exhibits 35, 11, 
and l lA are expense budgets during the marriage from 2006 through 2009, the last four years of 
the marriage, prepared by Stacy by grouping Quicken records by Quicken category and by year. 
(Tr. p. 64, L. 2-8, p. 83, L. 3-16) She listed all three exhibits in order to avoid confusion for this 
Court because the only exhibits that this Court has to look at are Exhibits 11 and l lA. Stacy 
doesn't need all three admitted. Exhibit 35 is preferable because it is sorted by category type 
and the other two are sorting alphabetically by category and harder to digest. 
All three Exhibits were excluded from evidence under Rule 1006 of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence because the paper bank statements had not been provided to Mark by Stacy. Stacy did 
not use the paper bank statements to populate Quicken. She used the internet, and electronically 
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downloaded the banking transactions. (Tr. p, 83, L. l ~ p. 84, L. 25 and Tr. p. 76, L. 1-15) The 
original banking transactions are in Quicken. The originals are not the paper bank statements. 
Stacy asked if she could explain to the magistrate how the exhibits for this case were created and 
he replied No. (Tr. p. 73, Ls. 11-23.) Mark conveniently left that out of his brief to this Court, 
literally ending the testimony cited right before the magistrate said no to Stacy's request. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 13). The magistrate didn't want to hear anything that may render his 
ruling incorrect. This is similar to what happened in Carr v. Edgar•335 P.3d 578, 583 (Idaho 
2014 ), where this same magistrate refused to permit that introduction of evidence that would 
overturn his ruling. He was reversed. 
Stacy explained in her brief how categories work in Quicken. (Appellant's Briefpgs. 
15-17). Page 17 states, " ... when dealing with Quicken categories one needs to know what 
category was assigned to each banking transaction if one wants to prove or disprove a Quicken 
report by Category. It is also clear if one looks at Exhibits 11 and 11-A that this is true. The 
figures on that report are grouped by the Category. So in order to authentic the evidence that 
Stacy presented one must have access to the original Quicken records which are stored solely 
with the Quicken software program itself." There is no case law in Idaho on the Quicken 
program or its records. Stacy found a case IN RE NWFX INC.,267 B.R. 118, (Bankr. W.D. 
Ark. 2001), that did specifically speak about Quicken categories and she referenced it in the 
attempt to help explain how Quicken categories work. She did not reference it as any type of 
proof of the admissibility of Quicken records under the rules of evidence. 
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That case states, "A check was written for $41,600.00, and it was coded in the Quicken 
Records category as 'Legal Fees' ... 42" " 42Check number 2707 payable to the Rose Law Firm in the 
amount of $41,600.00 and dated June 15, 1992." (Appellant's Brief page 16) The footnote 42 
lists the banking institution data: check munber, payee, amount, and date. To that banking 
institution data a category is then assigned/coded in the Quicken records, and it becomes the 
complete Quicken record. The Quicken category is not on a banking transaction. It is unique 
to the Quicken Program. 
Evidently that was not clear to the Respondent's attorneys because their brief to this 
Court states, "Without the underlying bank records, Mark would have no way to verify the 
amounts, the dates, and most significantly, the categories for which Stacy assigned certain 
expenditures." (Respondent's Briefp. 12) With the underlying paper bank records Mark would 
have still have no way to accurately verify the categories to which Stacy assigned certain 
banking transactions because the categories are not on the bank statements. Again the original 
underlying bank records live in Quicken not on a piece of paper. For the paper bank statements 
to be the originals Stacy would have had to manually input the bank record data from them by 
hand, and she did not do that because there is so much room for user error. 
The original source of all of the data that appears on Exhibit 35 is Quicken itself, and is a 
combination of an electronic bank transaction plus a Quicken category. The sustained objection 
for Exhibit 35 was that Stacy did not provide Mark the bank statements. (Tr. p. 76, L. 21 - 77., 
L. 4) The bank statements are not the original, and are in fact useless to authenticate Exhibit 35 
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because they do not contain the Quicken category. The original is the banking transaction plus 
the Quicken category and it lives in Quicken. Quicken was made available to Mark back in 
March of 2013. Stacy sent Mark an email on March 18, 2013 notifying Mark he could look at 
the Quicken records ifhe wanted to see them. Mark never responded. (Exhibit 39) Quicken 
was also made available at the deposition. 
MR. BEVIS: Judge these were produced on October 14, 2013. So he's had plenty of 
opportunity to request these back-up documents. That further, in that regard, at his 
- at her deposition she was asked about those. She clearly revealed in her 
deposition on November 14, 2013, that there were Quicken records that supported 
Exhibits 11 and 11-A. And as a result they have been made available. They 
haven't requested them.. (Tr., p. 96, L.198 - p. 97, L. 7.) 
Mark's attorney also asked Stacy about Quicken at the deposition. 
Q. BY MR. BEVIS: At the deposition, Stacy, were you asked by Mr. Welsh about 
Quicken? 
A. I was asked about -
MR. WELSH: Judge, I'm going to object 
THE WilNESS: - Quicken 
MR. WELSH: - irrelevant whether I did or didn't ask her the question. It's not 
relevant. 
Q. BY MR. BEVIS: And did he - at that point in time, did he -
THE COURT: No. 
Q. BY MR. BEVIS: - did he ask to see the -
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. (Tr. p. 77, L. 16-p. 78, L. 3.) 
The sustained objection for Exhibit 35 was that Stacy did not provide Mark the bank statements. 
This was magistrate error because the bank statements were not the original. The magistrate 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 11 
would not admit Exhibit 39, the email regarding Quicken from Stacy to Mark. This was also 
error. Finally the sustained objection regarding Mr. Welsh asking Stacy about Quicken is also 
error. The sustained objections were to prevent the magistrate from having to overturn his 
ruling which would have allowed Exhibit 35 into evidence. Again this is a strikingly similar 
situation to what he did in Carr v. Edgar. 
The district court allowed all of these sustained objections on Exhibit 35 to stand. His 
opinion on Exhibit 35 states that, "Exhibit 35 was a summary in that it was based upon the 
appellant's input of information from various bills and statements. See Trial Transcript at 84. (R. 
364) Tr. at 84 states that Stacy got the information into Quicken by downloading it off the 
internet from the bank statements, not that she input it from various bills and statements. His 
opinion says that Stacy had not made available for examination or copying, or both, the originals 
or copies of the underlying records at a reasonable time and place to the respondent prior to trial. 
She did not have them with her in court at the time the objection to the exhibit was made. The 
trial court ruled this was not timely and precluded the summary. The appellant offered to 
produce the records. The appellant has not shown this was an abuse of discretion considering the 
stage of the trial and the delay that would have been necessary to evaluate them." (R. 364) The 
district apparently forgot his cogent comment at hearing regarding bank statements. 
THE COURT: The one question I had is, we're talking about records during the marriage. 
And, of course, community property stayed, both parties are equal managers of the 
community property. And your client would be, theoretically, the custodian of records, as 
well as his former wife. It seems a little different twist on an exhibit where both parties, 
at least legally, have the same right to the records. (Appeal Tr. p. 31,32) 
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The district court made the same error that the magistrate court did assuming that the originals 
were paper statements. Exhibit 35 should have been admitted into evidence. 
Mark argues in his brief that "[e]ven if Exhibit 35 had been admitted it contained no 
relevant or probative information because what the parties spent during 2006 and [through] 2009 
is not germane in light of the actual income received by the parties. The income in those years 
did not exceed $300,000 (with the exception of2009 when it was $305,012). Therefore, had the 
magistrate court admitted Petitioner's Exhibits 11, I IA, and 35, it would not have changed the 
outcome of the case in light of the facts that the parties had to borrow funds to cover their 
expenses and the income levels during those years." (Respondent's brief p. I 7, 18) There is no 
case law cited to support this argument. 
It matters not that income was below $300,000 in those years. And in fact income was 
2008: $297,960 2007: $252,150, 2006: $216,328 (Exhibit 10) The borrowing of funds was a line 
of credit and a loan from Mark's dad in 2005 and 2006. (Tr. p. 78, L. 4-15) There is nothing 
wrong with having a line of credit and a loan from Dad. The line of credit payments were a 
mere $6,000 a year (R. p. 25) There is nothing to indicate that they were paying anything to 
Mark's father in the record. What the parties spent from 2006 - 2009 is exactly what the 
magistrate asked for at the pre-trial. It is relevant and it is very probative. 
Exhibit 35/11/1 lA shows that for 2008 and 2009 when income was right at $300,000 
what the expenses for a family of four were. It also breaks out children's expenses in great 
detail. What it does completely standing on its own is that it shows that for this family the child 
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support calculation of $1,726 per month at $300,000 of income is not appropriate for these 
children. An upward deviation is required. 
The District Court Erred in Affirming That The Exclusion Of Evidence Under The 
New I.R.F.L.P Rule 102 .. B.2 Was Correct 
This case was heard under the new Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure, ("I.R.F.L.P") 
which Stacy discussed at length in her brief. (Appellant's Briefpgs. 22-25) There is a new 
brand new rule in the I.R.F.L.P., Rule 102, which includes Rule 102.B. The Idaho Supreme 
Court Website is clear on why this new rule was put into place in family law cases. 
Rule 102.B is designed to be simpler and easier to apply than the more formal and 
technical rules in the IRE which often operates to restrict the admission of relevant 
evidence. The less formal new rule should facilitate the presentation of relevant evidence 
at trial for all parties http:/.'www.isc.idaho.gm/rules/irflp/IRFLP FAQs 4-14.pd[ 
The Respondent addressed this rule for this Court only in part, Rule 102.B.2. The entire Rule 
l 02.B needs to be read to understand its entire meaning: 
I.R.F.L.P Rule 102.B. Applicability of Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
I. Upon notice to the court filed by any party within thirty (30) days after a response or 
other responsive pleading is filed, or, if none, within forty-two ( 42) days from the filing 
of the motion or petition, or such other date as may be established by the court, any party 
may require strict compliance with the Idaho Rules of Evidence, except as provided in 
Rule 102.B.3. 
2. If no such notice is filed, all relevant evidence is admissible, provided, however, that 
the court shall exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, lack of reliability or failure to 
adequately and timely disclose same. This admissibility standard shall replace rules 403, 
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602, 801-806, 901-903 and 1002-1005, Idaho Rules of Evidence, except as provided in 
Rule 102.B.3. All remaining provisions of the Idaho Rules of Evidence apply. 
3. Regardless of whether a notice is filed under Rule 102.B.1, records of regularly 
conducted activity as defined in Rule 803(6), Idaho Rules of Evidence, may be admitted 
into evidence without testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness as to its 
authenticity if such document (i) appears complete and accurate on its face, (ii) appears to 
be relevant and reliable, and (iii) is seasonably disclosed and copies are provided at time 
of disclosure to all other parties. 
The record shows through testimony at trial that the records in Quicken met the standards of 
regularly conducted activity according to this new rule. Stacy used Quicken from 2006 through 
2009 to balance the checkbook, and Mark was aware that she used Quicken. (Tr., p. 64, Ls. 
4-23) Stacy had been operating Quicken prior to 2006, she used to do Mark's QuickBooks for 
his business, and she has been doing this type of work for 14 years or longer. (Tr., p. 99, 
Ls.17-22.) Stacy worked for a financial management firm and was a computer programmer 
there, and Quicken is a computer program. (Tr., p. I 00, Ls. 5-11.) Stacy operated Quicken 
appropriately and accurately to produce Exhibits 11 and 11-A, and 35... (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 12-16.) 
There were no objections at trial to any of this testimony. Neither Mark, the magistrate court, 
nor the district court ever state anywhere in this record that Quicken records regularly conducted 
to balance a family checkbook fail to satisfy Rule I 02.B.2. There is no case law on this to date. 
Exhibit 35 should have been admitted pursuant to Rule I 02.B.2 
The District Court Erred in Affirming the Magistrate Court's Award of Child Support. 
Its Decision Was Not Based On Substantial Evidence 
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The magistrate erred because he did not consider the spending during the marriage due to 
his improper exclusion of Exhibit 35. Mark asserts that because income from 2006 through 
2009 did not exceed $300,000 per year there is no basis to exceed the recommended support 
under the Guidelines. (Respondent's Briefp. 18,19) This makes no sense at all. The income 
figures at the time of trial were $550,000 and $38,000, clearly over $300,000. It doesn't matter 
what the incomes were from 2006 through 2009. Exhibit 35 is a standard of living report from 
during the marriage. He then asserts that Stacy was trying to show with the chart below that 
there was substantial money left over after expenses, yet has totally failed to account for the fact 
that the income figures are pre-tax. (Respondent's Brief p. 19) What this chart shows is that 
there was money left over to pay taxes, but that was not the point of this chart. The point of this 
chart was to show what the average monthly expenses were. This chart shows that expenses 
were very stable over a four year period even though income increased. This chart shows that 
they spend nearly the same amount of money on the children over a four year period. This chart 
shows that they were spending way more than $1,726 per month at $300,000 of income for 2008 
and 2009. This chart shows that even when income was lower in 2006 and 2007 they were still 
spending about the same amount each month. This chart shows that the child support 
calculation in this case is too low and a deviation was required. Stacy had to use data from 
Exhibits 11/l IA because Exhibit 35 was improperly excluded. Exhibits 11/1 lA were preserved 
for appeal which means this Court can look at the data contained in them. The data is the same 
for Exhibits 35/11/l IA. 
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Spending on the Children During the Marriage 2006-2009 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Incon:e 223,873 252,150 297,960 305,012 
Expenses 146,089 157,402 162,349 145,012 
Diflerence 77,784 94,748 135,611 160,000 
Monthly Expenses $ 12,174 $ 13,117 $ 13,529 $ 12,084 
Chik:I Support Ordered: $1,726 0) exactly $300,000 ofcombined incon:e 
Mark asserts that Stacy needed to show that the children's current needs exceed the 
recommended child support under the Guidelines. (Respondent's Brief p. 19) The children are 
entitled to child support as if the marriage remained intact. Mark presented no evidence of his 
current standard ofliving which would have been the standard of living if the marriage remained 
intact. Given that his income was $550,000 it is extremely doubtful the standard ofliving 
would have decreased. Also given that the children are much older, eating more, wearing adult 
size clothing, the standard of living would have increased most very likely. 
Garner v. Garner, 158 Idaho 932,354 P.3.d 494 (2015) states the amount of support 
indicated by the Guidelines "is the amount of support to be awarded unless evidence establishes 
that amount to be inappropriate." Exhibit 35/11/1 lA establishes that amount to be inappropriate 
at $300,000 of income so it would also be inappropriate at $550,000. 
Mark says there was no evidence at trial to establish the I.R.F.L.P 126(1)(4) factors would 
warrant an award of additional support above the Guidelines income schedules. (Respondent's 
Brief p. 22) Exhibit 35/11/11 A is factor c. One can plainly see from that Table that the child 
support calculated warrants an upward deviation. He says there was no evidence presented at 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 17 
trial that would support the conclusion that the children's needs were so exceptional as to require 
that additional support be paid, especially in light of the fact that the children are with the parties 
on an equal basis. (Respondent's Briefp. 22) The only thing that matters with the children 
being with the parties equally is that food will be less, water and electricity will be slightly less, 
that's about it. The child's needs were not exceptional they were average for the income bracket 
that they were in. They are just way higher than what the child support calculation computes. 
Housing expenses for 2009 were at $5, I 00 per month, and there is nothing super excessive there. 
(Exhibit 11) 
Mark makes this huge deal about Stacy ignoring the marriage from 2001-2005. Stacy 
addressed the standard of living during the marriage for the records that she had in her Quicken 
database. They began in 2006 explained at trial. She can't make stuff up for those other years. 
In terms of low incomes from 2001-2005, Stacy has previously addressed this in this reply. 
Income in 2000 was over $600,000. Net proceeds of the sale of a home in 2003 was over 
$600,000. Mark in his brief chose to ignore those two figures. They had plenty of money to 
live on, and have a high standard of living. 
Mark states Stacy insinuates that there is a huge disparity in their homes, and goes on to 
state that they are similar in size and that it is difficult to see much of disparity. But he also 
states hers was $430,000 and she put $60,000 into it and his was $600,000. (Respondent's Brief. 
P. 26) I guess when you are as rich is Mark is a $110,000 price differential doesn't appear to be 
a disparity. This may be an indictor of why he doesn't mind throwing thousands upon 
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thousands of dollars away on attorney's fees rather than sitting down with Exhibit 35/11/1 lA and 
determining a fair child support figure for his children. He is a Chartered Financial Analyst and 
the co Chief Investment Officer, he is really the one that is the expert here on budgets. 
Mark states that the magistrate considered each and every factor in his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law. (Respondent's Brief p. 27) He did consider them but he did not consider 
them all correct! y. 
In regard to Rule 126(J)(4)(b), the magistrate states, "Crucial in the Jensen case as in the 
case at bar are the present expenses of the parties and how it relates to their respective incomes. 
In the Jensen case the parties presented extensive evidence on the parties' present expenses which 
allowed the court to analyze the parties respective resources. However here that is not 
possible." (R. 195) If a factor is that crucial to this rule then the rule should explicity state that 
it is a requirement and the current wording does not do that. 
126(1)(4). Income over $300,000. The Guideline Income schedules are not a limitation on 
the award of child support for combined Guidelines Income above $300,000 per year. 
The support based on the first $300,000 shall be calculated by these Guidelines in 
proportion to the relative incomes of the parents. In determining any additional support 
for Guidelines Income above $300,000, the court shall consider all relevant factors, 
which may include: 
So if a Judge thinks that any of those factors are crucial he should make it known prior to his 
ruling. After all these are cases about child support. It's a Judge's duty to protect the rights of 
the children not the parent. "In Idaho, "[in] any proceeding where child support is under 
consideration, child support shall be given priority over the needs of the parents" Garner v. 
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Gamer, #41898, 2015 Opinion No. 72, July 22, 2015, p.6. In Stacy's case the ruling came down 
to current needs of Stacy not being before the magistrate. 'The parties incomes were disclosed 
however no current expenses or obligations of either party were disclosed for this court to 
determine even tangentially, the possible disposable income of either party. Without evidence as 
to expenses or obligations this court could not, without speculation determine if the children's 
standard of living increased, decreased or stayed the stay." (R. p. 198). Stacy thinks that the 
magistrate could have made a very educated evaluation as to the current standard ofliving of the 
children. Stacy testified that she was spending her property settlement and her savings and her 
husband Dan was also contributing in order for the children to retain the standard of!iving that 
they had enjoyed prior to alimony ending. (Tr. p. 90,91) Stacy had to spend the alimony to 
keep up with the standard ofliving the children enjoyed during the marriage. 
In regard to Rule 126(J)(4)(c), the magistrate states 
Standard of living of the children during the marriage. 
Attached to the memorandum of understanding and incorporated into the decree of 
divorce was a listing of the expenses of the parties and their children as 
"non-discretionary spending" and "discretionary spending" under a common title of "joint 
expense worksheet". 
Since both parties stipulated to split these costs during the time Mark paid alimony (see 
memorandum of understanding) these expenses clearly show the standard of living the 
childrenwere used to during the marriage. 
The enly evidenee presented at the tfial that these ei,jlenses eeHtimie sn tedaj· are listed 
in Petitiener's Ei,hieit #3 and ef these Staey testified enly a peFtien ef the eest ef e)[hieit 
#3 'Neala aetaally ee inearreEI. 
Beth Staey and Mark testified as te vaeatiens taken with the ehildren eat neither party 
presented any eests related te these endeavsrs. 
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In 2009 the parties standard of living was set forth in the parties "Joint Expenses 
Worksheet" attached to their memorandum of understanding incorporated into their 
decree of divorce. 
Assuming Mark's $300,000.00 of income was the parties sole income, and their expenses 
were as set forth in the joint expenses worksheet then the parties had disposable income 
of$182,354.00 without considering any deductions for taxes. 
New Staey and Ii.er Bevr li.B.saand Ii.a-Ye petem:ial iBeeme ef $139,983.00 (li.B.saands 
iBeeme) $34,128.00 (Marie's pay-mem: te Staey fer steek) $38,000.00 (Staey's imputed 
iBeeme) and $1,731.53 per meB.tli. er $20,778.30 per year iB Bew ehild SlipfleFt fer a tetal 
ef$232,889.3e iB fiB.aB.eial resel!fees. 
Marie elearly has mere iBeeme at $550,000.00 per year. 
Hewever Beith.er f)arty presem:ed te the eemt their eJ(fleB.ses. 
Beeause Beith.er party Ii.as preseBted e-YideBee eeBeemiag their respeetive Beeds and 
ealigatieBs this eellft eannet determiae if the standard efliving eitperieBeed ay the 
ehildreB dllriBg tb.e marriage Ii.as aeeB retIBeed, iBereased er has stayed the same. 
Staey testified that Marie has Bever deBied her a refj_11est fer meBey fer eittra ellrrielllar 
aetiv-ities. (R. 195, 196) (strikethroughs added) 
Rule l 26(J)( 4)(C) is the standard ofliving the child enjoyed during the marriage. It does not 
state compare the standard of living during the marriage to the current standard of living. Nor 
does it state list the standard ofliving during the marriage and the current standard of living. 
Mark himself stated this in his brief. "Rule I 26(J)( 4 )( c) takes into consideration the standard of 
living during the marriage, not the standard ofliving of the parties at the time of the 
modification." (Respondent's Brief, p. 5). As such there should not need to be any comparison 
to current standard ofliving. Standard ofliving the child enjoyed during the marriage should be 
analyzed on its own. 
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The district court stated, "He reviewed the applicable factors in relation to the evidence 
presented. There is no identification of a specific factor tied to an error by the magistrate. The 
magistrate did not abuse his discretion." (R. p. 368) Stacy respectfully disagrees with the district 
court. The magistrate did make errors on factors B and C. The decision of the district court 
should be reversed by this Court. 
The District Court Erred In Affirming That Stacy's Lack Of Veracity Was 
Unimportant To The Magistrate's Decision 
"Stacy's argument with regard to this particular issue on appeal is not entirely clear. The 
district court held that the magistrate's reference to Stacy's veracity did not amount to any bias to 
Stacy." (Respondent's Brief, p. 28) Stacy believes that it did amount to bias to Stacy. He went 
out of his way to make up a story in order to put her veracity into question, but it was entirely 
false. See Appellants Brief pp. 32-36. Why was he so irritated that he did that? And wouldn't 
this irritation flow through to his ruling? Crafting a false statement is slander, and and it matters 
not if what he did would have changed the outcome of the case. He violated the Judicial Code 
of Conduct. 
In reading through the Code the magistrate also violated it by completely losing his 
temper, and speaking in an extremely demeaning manner to Stacy. 
THE COURT: Dont give me a look like that. You don't talk while we're discussing something 
here okay? You '11 only respond to questions; understand? (Tr. p. 71, L.16-18). 
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Finally Stacy thinks that he may have violated it a third time. The magistrates wife was 
the Executive Director at the University ofldaho from September 2008 - July 2014. Mark's 
partner Bill Gilbert was Chairman of the University ofldaho Foundation in 2008. He has also 
served as President. He is an Emeritus Director. J. Richard Rock another partner of Mark's as 
well as co-Chief Investment Officer with Mark, has served as Director of the University of Idaho 
Foundation. In the 2008 Annual Report his name is listed in donating $500,000 - $999,999, 
Bill Gilbert's is listed as donating $5,000 - $9,999. It makes much more sense now how the 
magistrate new so much about these two partners at Caprock at the pre-trial conference. Corr. 
Tr. p. 17, L. 11 - p. 19, L. 9) Stacy does realize that this is a very small town and that everyone 
has connections to the University of Idaho, but this is over the top. Mark's partner donating 
such a large some of money to your wife's place of work? The magistrate should have 
respectfully removed himself from the case. This information is available as public records on 
the internet. 
Stacy is aware that generally new issues cannot be raised on appeal, but Stacy did not 
have this evidence at the time of the trial hearing, so she could not give it Mr. Bevis to present at 
district appeal. And she didn't have it when she wrote the Appellant Brief for this Court. 
Tax Exemptions 
Stacy is aware that is perfectly fine for magistrate to follow the Guidelines. He clearly 
did not abuse discretion by following the rules. But the magistrate also had broad discretion, 
and so does this Court. See Stacy's brief for the argument. 
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The District Court Erred By Not Awarding Attorney's Fees To Stacy Pursuant to I.C. § 
32-704, I.C §32-705, I.C §12-121 and Section XIII Of The MOU Attached To The Decree 
Mark incorrectly asserts that Stacy was able to pay her attorney fees as they came do. 
Stacy stated that she had paid $10,000 and that she still owes more money for attorney's fees. 
(Tr. p. 91, L. 6-11.) 
Mark time and again in his brief and now in the section has stated that Stacy filed the 
request to modify child support, like this is some sort of punishment she has inflicted unto Mark. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 36.) Child support recalculation was agreed upon by both parties and 
was mandated by the MOU attached to decree to be recalculated. Stacy just read another new 
case Kesting v. Kesting, Docket No. 42875, a case involving a mutually agreed upon alimony 
settlement in a domestic relations case. As in Kesting, Stacy and Mark were free to consider 
factors not included in Idaho Code 32-705, (Kesling p. 7, footnote 2) which they did, specifically 
the recalculation of child support after alimony ended December 31, 2012. Their MOU is an 
enforceable domestic relations agreement. Stacy is not an attorney she is at a deficit here, but it 
seems that she could have filed to have that agreement enforced after reading Kesting. She has 
been unable to do any further research because this brief is due. 
When Stacy went to see Mr. Bevis at the request of Mark, his first question to her was 
have you filed a Petition to Modify because until you do, Mark doesn't have to pay any 
retroactive child support. Stacy had no idea about this. In January of2013 Mark had told her 
that he would paying child support back to January 1, 2013 no matter how long it took to arrive 
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at the new support figure. He didn't hold to his word. He started paying April 1, 2013 as the 
magistrate ordered. So it is actually a very good thing that Mark did ask her to seek counsel or 
who knows how many more months may have gone by. Child support had to be recalculated 
because of Mark's decision with alimony and low child support. Clearly he was not going to 
file a Petition to Modify, so Stacy had to. 
"However an award of child support per the Guidelines of $1,726 plus coverage of all 
those other expenses was not enough for Stacy; she wanted more." (Respondent's Brief, p. 3 7) 
Health insurance is at $4,500 a year, pre tax dollars. The kids are extremely healthy, and neither 
has had braces. Kate wears glasses. Mark has eye insurance. He pays for the children's cell 
phones on his business account and gets a great deal. He offered 100% of his son's lacrosse 
versus 94% or what was ordered. And he only offered 75% for his own daughter's acting. 
Mark's offers were really not all that generous and do not replace basic child support. $1,726 a 
month is not an appropriate child support figure for these children. 
Mark's refusal to accept the initial child support of$2,537 back in March of2013 
is what drove this case to court. (Respondent's Brief, p. 37) That is a true statement. If Mark 
had accepted it, there would be no court. Even that $2,537 figure is meager given the standard 
of living the children enjoyed during the marriage. Still Stacy offered that right before that trial 
and Mark rejected it. 
Mark did attempt to resolve matters without going to trial, but those negotiations 
obviously failed. (Respondent's Brief, p. 3 7) The record shows that they had a discussion 
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January 2013. It does not state what the discussion was about except that this Court knows that 
Mark asked Stacy to hire an attorney to discuss imputed income. Mark offered no settlement 
negotiation in his Answer to Petition. Mark cancelled the settlement negotiation the week 
before the trial. There is nothing in the record stating that Mark attempted to resolve matters 
without going to trial. In fact Mark told Stacy specifically that he was planning on going to trial 
in August of 2013. 
Stacy's arguments as to why she is entitled attorney's fees are in her brief. However 
after writing this reply she wanted to also point out that the district court cited Montgomery v. 
Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6,205 P.3d 650,655 (2009) in his opinion. 
When an exercise of discretion is involved, this Court conducts a three step analysis (1) 
whether the trial court perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
specific choices; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by the exercise of reason. 
Cameron, 130 Idaho at 902,950 P.2d at 1241. Stacy does not believe that the Magisrate met 
this three pronged analysis. Respectfully the district court ruling should be reversed by this 
Court. 
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Mark is Not Entitled to an Awarded Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred in Defending 
Against Stacy's Appeal 
Neither the magistrate nor district court awarded Mark's attorney's fees. Stacy did not 
bring this case frivolously. She had to file a Petition to Modify or the children's child support 
would be left at $385 per month. The record shows that there was nothing on the table from 
Mark in which to have settlement negotiations. Stacy is not inviting this Court to second guess 
the district court on conflicting evidence. There was no conflicting evidence or testimony. The 
district court stated at the hearing: Which was another question, assuming it's interpreted that --
in reading the transcript, I had a hard time finding any place where there appeared to be any 
significant impeachment of either party. They both seemed to testify pretty straightforward. (P. 
29, L. 20-25). 
Stacy did not fail to make a cogent challenge to the judge's exercise of discretion. The 
magistrate court here did not do an exceptional job of carefully and thoughtfully deciding this 
case. And the district court ruling was rather sparse. There should be no award of attorney's 
fees under Idaho Code 12-121. 
Mark complains that Stacy presents the same argument that she put before the magistrate 
court and the district court. As he stated in his brief new issues cannot be argued on appeal. 
Stacy believes that she did make many cogent arguments justifying a reversal of the district 
judge's decision affirming the magistrates ruling. 
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Stacy did present evidence of the specific factors germane to warranting a deviation from 
the Guidelines under I.R.F.L.P 126(J)(4)(a)-(g). 
Conclusion 
The record demonstrates that magistrate court did not properly address the issues and 
findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Exhibit 35 should have been entered into 
Evidence, under I.RE 1006 and I.R.F.L.P 102.B.2. The magistrate court abused its discretion 
when it denied Stacy her request to deviate from the guidelines and award support over the 
calculated amount. The district court improperly affirmed the magistrate ruling. Stacy's brief 
does demonstrate reversible error by the district court. Respectfully, Stacy requests this Court 
to reverse the district court's Opinion on Appeal. Stacy also respectfully requests this Court to 
award her attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho code 32-704, 32-705, 12-121 and 12-107; 
Idaho Appellant Rules 35(b)(4), 35(b)(5), and 41; and Idaho Rule of Procedure 908. 
With all sincerity Stacy did not bring this case to this Court frivolously. She has been a 
diligent, studying the law as much as she can, to come up with cogent arguments and cite them if 
she can find citations. She knows how overworked and underpaid this Court ( and all courts) 
are. She has a great deal of respect for the time and effort you and your staff expend serving 
justice. Stacy is not here to waste your precious time. She is here because she believes that 
that ruling should be reversed. She is here because it is important that her children see her 
fighting for a cause, standing up for justice, and fighting the fear that has come with arguing this 
prose. 
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It is rather fascinating to Stacy that Mr. Welsh, the magistrate judge, and the district 
judge all were a part of the Jensen case twenty years ago, and now this strikingly similar case is 
here before this Court. Stacy would like to make a personal comment regarding that case that 
may come as a surpnse. 
I believe in some sort of type of cap. I was shocked when I found out that parties can go 
back and modify child support simply because an ex-spouse is making more money. I am sure 
there are circumstances that warrant that, but in a case of high income to begin with, if an 
appropriate child support award is set according to the standard of living the children enjoyed 
during the marriage then that child support figure should last the duration of child support. Of 
course the parties would really have to prepare for all expenses that will come forth as the child 
grow and incorporate those. Like Mark and I didn't think about our kids driving and now we 
are arguing over how to deal with that. I do think with everything being electronic now, it will 
be much easier for the parties to get a true accounting of what that standard ofliving is. And I 
do think there is a market for a Child Support Quicken Expert in the field of law. A third party 
that has no ties that takes your electronic data and creates budgets. And what would be amazing 
is if all that data could then be used to start to compile a database which could eventually be 
worked into the child support calculation. It would be pretty ironic if after all of this I ended up 
with a career. 
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Dated this /'i5'#} day of May, 2016. 
Stacy Loughmiller, prose 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18
1
h day of May, 2016, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REPLY TO THE RESPONDENT;S BRIEF, by cause to be place a copy thereof 
in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
Stanley W. Welsh 
COSHO HUMPREY, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 9518 
Boise, ID 83707-9518 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Stacy Loughmiller being sworn, deposes and says that I am the appellant in the above-entitled appeal, and 
that all statements in this notice of appeal are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Signature of Appellant 
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